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STATE-BUILDING AND  
SUB-NATIONAL TENSIONS  
IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN   
Elisa Giunchi 
The transition to a democratic system in Afghanistan and Pakistan has not silenced ethnic and 
religious tensions. The paper argues that sub-national identities in both countries have been 
politicized as a result of the unequal access to political power and economic resources and of foreign 
interference. While attempts to foster national cohesion by reference to a common religion may 
backfire, as the Pakistani case illustrates, more needs to be done to involve all elements of civil society, 
irrespective of their sub-national belonging, in the state-building process, to promote freedom of 
expression and purge textbooks from ethno- or religious-centric narratives.  
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Although there is an ample literature on post-conflict reconstruction in 
ethnically diverse countries, it mostly refers to state building – that is, the 
construction of official institutions – rather than nation-building – the 
crafting of an all-encompassing sense of identity through political, 
cultural and educational policies. This is in part due to the assumption, 
based on the European experience, that an overarching sense of belonging 
and solidarity is already in place and that, if not, it will automatically 
follow the building of national institutions.  
Perhaps as a consequence of this assumption, what was initially written 
about the post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan was fairly optimistic: 
in 2001-2002, many observers took for granted that the democratic 
transition would result in a nation-building process that would ultimately 
submerge sub-national identities. Being able to express their grievances 
and see them redressed within a democratic framework, Afghan citizens 
would presumably relegate particularistic identities to the private realm. 
The underlying assumption was that sub-national identities were a relic of 
the past that were bound to be swept away as modernization, and its 
political component – democracy – advanced.  
And yet, to this day ethnic and religious identities remain politically relevant 
Afghanistan, as in many countries in Asia and Africa, irrespective of regime 
type. Afghan political parties are divided along ethnic and religious lines, 
clientelistic policies are intertwined with ethnic fragmentation and feed into 
it, and ethnic disaffection towards the government is a relevant political and 
security issue. Another example is that of Pakistan. The return to democracy, 
in 1988 and more recently in 2008 gave rise to the expectation that internal 
religious strife and ethnic disaffection would subside as Pakistanis were 
allowed to express their grievances through the ballot. This, however, has not 
been the case so far. Religious violence has become endemic, and ethnic strife 
is simmering below the surface, occasionally erupting in violent 
confrontations. 
In the following pages we will briefly see how politicization of sub-national 
identities has occurred in these two countries and provide some 
policy-oriented suggestions. 
The politicization of ethnic identity in Afghanistan 
Since antiquity, what is now Afghanistan has been traversed by traders, 
pilgrims and soldiers mostly originating from Central Asia. As a 
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consequence of these movements, this country is today heterogeneous in 
ethno-linguistic and religious terms1. It is only quite recently, though, that 
these differences have become politically relevant.  
The main ethnic group since the formation of the state in the 18th century 
has been the Pashtuns, who originated from the Suleiman range and 
gradually moved west. Political power long rested in their hands, and it was 
only in the late 19th century that the construction of a modern Afghan state 
under Abdur Rahman on the basis of Pashtun identity was challenged by 
ethnic minorities. This was made possible by changing demography, which 
was to a great extent imposed by external powers – mainly Britain and 
Russia who were at the time entangled in the Great Game. As the amir lost 
part of its Pashtun population in the south to the British Raj following the 
Durand line agreement in 1893, and consolidated its conquests to the north, 
absorbing with British aid areas that were inhabited by other ethnic groups, 
the kingdom became more diverse. Ethnic minorities, which for the first 
time were numerically relevant, started demanding more political inclusion, 
influenced by European ideas of the modern state. Their demands were 
easily resisted, and did not constitute a problem for a while, as ethnic 
minorities lacked serious external supporters and could not successfully 
challenge the coercive power of the central state. Who ruled in Kabul was in 
any case of limited importance, as chieftains and warlords de facto ruled 
over vast portions of the territory and the authority of the central power 
rested on granting great autonomy to these local power brokers.  
The country started being torn along ethnic lines in the late 1970s and 
1980s, when mujaheddin groups coalesced around ethnic and religious 
identities, with foreign countries supporting one or the other out of 
geostrategic concerns. Ethnic fissures deepened after the Soviet 
withdrawal. In 1992, a coalition of non-Pashtun mujaheddin headed by 
Tagiks conquered Kabul, and Gulbuddin Hektmatyar, the Pashtun head 
of the Hezb-e-Islami who was supported by Pakistan, bombed the city to 
dislodge its Tagik lords. The country precipitated into a full-fledged civil 
war, with the Taliban, who expressed Pashtun interests and ethos, 
emerging in 1994 in the southern belt and sweeping in a few years most of 
the country. While the Taliban received support from Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia the UAE, plus informal channels, drug trafficking and, after 1996, 
al-Qaeda, ethnic minorities resisted in the north and in isolated pockets in 
the west and centre, supported by India, Iran, China and some Central 
Asian republics, all fearful of the spread of Sunni extremism in the region 
                                                             
1 The Pashtuns are approximately 42% of the total population. Next are the Tajiks with 
27%. The Uzbeks and Hazaras constitute approximately 9% each. The remaining 13% 
is made of smaller communities. Afghanistan is homogeneous along religious lines: 99% 
of the population is Muslim, 80% of whom are Sunnis. Most Shias live in the central 
Hazarajat and in the western regions of the country, close to the Iranian border. 
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and wary of the designs of the Talibans‟ mentors.  
The Bonn Accords of December 2001 set out a transition process to 
democracy, and intermediate steps were scheduled to be completed in 
2004 with the introduction of a new constitution and the holding of 
national elections. The introduction of a democratic system allowed all 
ethnic and religious groups to be represented politically and opened up the 
institutions, at least on paper, to merit, irrespective to one‟s background 
and belonging. There were debates in the constitution making process on 
whether to formally recognize „ethnicity‟ within state institutions. Some 
argued that it may increase awareness of difference and thus hinder 
integration, while others held that an official recognition would promote a 
sense of security among minority groups thus preventing any further 
politicization of ethnic difference2.   
The issue of federalism was the object of heated discussions that reflected 
conflicting interests: demands for a parliamentary federation were made 
especially by the Uzbeks and the Hazaras, who are territorially 
concentrated. In contrast, Pashtuns, who mostly live in the southern part 
of the country, but also in other provinces, argued against a federation, 
fearing it would fragment their community and advantage the Tagiks. The 
latter are less territorially concentrated than the Uzbeks and the Hazaras, 
and thus focused on power sharing in the central state rather than on 
territorial autonomy3. The „centralizers‟ eventually had it their way, and 
the ineffectiveness of provincial councils has since then further promoted 
the centralization of the state, though a de facto large degree of autonomy 
is accorded to warlords in some parts of the country. The discussion of a 
parliamentary vs. presidential system followed similar patterns. Most 
Pashtuns wanted a presidential system, while Tajiks, Uzbeks, and 
Hazaras feared that a strong presidency would exclude them from power4.  
The Constitution approved in 2004 was a compromise: a presidential 
system was adopted though the powers of the presidency were tempered 
in some respects. The text provided for the protections for ethnic 
minorities, but rejected formal ethnic representation in state institutions 
and prohibited the “[f]ormation and operation of a party on the basis of 
tribalism, parochialism, language, as well as religious sectarianism”. 
While retaining Pashto and Dari as the official languages the Constitution 
provided that “[i]n areas where the majority of the people speak in any one 
                                                             
2 K. ADENEY, Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of “Community” 
Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the 
Post-Taliban Era, in «Asian Survey», vol. 48, no. 4, 2008, pp. 539-40. 
3 B.R. RUBIN, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, in «Journal of Democracy», vol. 
15, no. 3, 2004, p. 11. 
4 K. ADENEY, op. cit., p. 546. 
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of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi, or Pamiri [...] any of 
the afore- mentioned languages, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be 
the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law”. 
It was also provided that “the state shall [...] design and apply effective 
programs to foster and develop all languages of Afghanistan”5. 
These goodwill gestures to ethnic minorities were seen with some 
trepidation by Pashtuns, who already felt marginalized by the Bonn process. 
The Bonn Conference held in November 2001 had excluded the Taliban and 
those Pashtun groups who were reluctant to support Karzai or the political 
system envisaged by the international donors. Pashtun alienation was fed 
by the fact that the Tagiks were at first overrepresented in state 
institutions. The Northern Alliance (NA), which was dominated by the 
Tajiks of the Panjsheri Shura-yi Nezar, until 2004 controlled the 
bureaucracy, army and police6. In the provisional government Tajiks also 
took a majority of government positions, including most of the important 
ministries. Pashtuns, Hazaras and Uzbeks, on the contrary, suffered 
under-representation. This situation was later corrected by Karzai: the NA 
Tagik elite was to a great extent replaced by predominantly south and 
southeastern Pashtun and Western-educated technocrats in the ministries. 
But mutual suspicions lingered on: Pashtuns continued to feel marginalized 
by the transition process, while Hamid Karzai was accused of being biased 
in favour of them. 
Ethnic divisions were evident at times of elections, particularly 
presidential ones, with the vote turning into an ethnic census: Karzai, a 
Pushtun, who won in 2004 and 2009, did best among Pashtuns, while the 
other major candidates were supported by their own ethnic strongholds. 
Thus, for example, in 2004 the Tajik Yunus Qanooni led primarily in the 
northeastern Tajik region; Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq led in two 
Hazara-dominated provinces and among Afghan refugees in Iran, while 
the Uzbek war-lord Dostum attracted votes mainly from the north-central 
Uzbek part of the country. Subsequent elections confirmed this trend, 
though some mild change was visible in urban areas, where the ethnic 
vote broke down to make space for ideas and programmes.  
Some authors have held that the post-Bonn state building process has 
exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions7. Some of the reasons for this are 
                                                             
5 For the text of the 2004 Constitution see: 
http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html. 
6 A. JALALI, Afghanistan in 2002: The Struggle to Win the Peace, in «Asian Survey», 
vol. 43, no. 1, 2003, p. 175. 
7 M. BHATIA, Afghanistan, Armed Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-War 
Society, London 2007; A. WIMMER and C. SCHETTER, Putting state-formation first: 
some recommendations for reconstruction and peace-making in Afghanistan, in 
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internal: ethnic differences may have been magnified, as Shahran 
convincingly holds, by Karzai‟s policy of accommodating the interests of 
different networks, following an established pattern of patron-client 
relations8. Throughout the history of the country state elites have, in fact, 
coopted periphery forces, thus yielding to elements who are resistant to 
the project of building a nation-state. External powers have contributed to 
the exacerbation of ethnic tensions: the Bonn process has not, as we have 
seen, included most Pashtuns in the government, and regional powers 
have continued to support one faction or another. In addition, 
drug-traffickers, who have a vested interest in the persistence of a weak 
centre and a fragmented state, have allied with insurgents who oppose the 
consolidation of the state, further hindering the emergence of a national 
identity. 
The initial marginalization of Pashtuns and the exclusion of the Taliban 
from the democratic transition has been a cause of worry for Pakistan, 
which has based its Afghan policies since the 1970s on creating a Pashtun 
„client‟ that would pursue Islamabad‟s interests. Iran apparently retains 
its links with Dari-speaking Tajiks and with Afghan Shias, while 
cultivating cordial relationships with Karzai‟s government, despite 
accusations by the US that it has lent support to the Taliban. As Saudis 
also meddle in favour of the Pashtuns, and Central Asian republics view 
with sympathy their fellow ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the political 
stalemate remains characterized by the politicization of ethnic identity.  
Religious and ethnic strife in Pakistan 
Throughout the last ten years, nation-building in Afghanistan has centered 
around the idea that democracy and Islam would serve as aggregating 
forces hindering fissiparous tendencies. The 2004 constitution is an 
example of how these two elements stand side by side in an uneasy and 
ambiguous relationship. Reference to Islam is not a problem per se. The 
problem is rather that Islam in the country is controlled by traditionalist 
interpretations; the ministry of justice and the judiciary in particular are 
dominated by ultra-conservatives who do not interpret Islam in a way that 
is consonant to the democratic principles and institutions introduced in the 
post-Taliban political structure.  
Referring to Islam as a unifying force may also prove counter-productive 
in religiously divided countries, as the example of Pakistan indicates. 
When Pakistan was born in 1947, it was a mosaic of ethnic groups; 
mohajirs and Punjabis dominated the institutions of the newly formed 
                                                                                                                                             
«Journal of International Development», vol. 15, no. 5, 2003, pp. 525-39.  
8 T. SHARAN, The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron-Client Relations in 
Afghanistan, in «Europe-Asia Studies», vol. 63, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1109-1127.  
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state despite constituting a numerical minority; other major ethnic groups 
protested, and were supported in some cases, or so the Pakistanis have 
always claimed, by India and Afghanistan. Nationalist movements 
developed different agendas: Beluchis and Pashtuns, who had a long 
history of autonomy, wished to retain their customs and power structures 
with minimal interference from the centre, while Bengalis, who formed 
the majority of the population, protested against their 
under-representation at the federal and provincial level and state 
under-investment in the Eastern wing despite their contributions to the 
national budget. Sindhis also contested Punjabi over-representation, and 
increasingly faced within their province a rift with mohajirs, who thrived 
in urban areas, where Sindhis and Pashtuns formed a resentful 
sub-proletariat competing with each other for jobs and resources9.  
These fissiparous tensions were accompanied by a growing rift with 
neighboring India. In the aftermath of independence, Pakistan was 
entangled in its first war with India over the status of Kashmir. Other 
wars erupted in 1965 and in 1971, when India‟s entrance into the civil war 
allowed the Eastern wing to secede and become Bangladesh. Unwilling to 
correct the pro-Punjabi bias that characterized its institutions, the state 
elites, despite their cosmopolitan and modernist outlook, opted to focus on 
the common Islamic identity. This meant de facto allying with traditional 
religious forces that had wide following in rural and tribal areas, such as 
the JUI (Jamat Ulema-e-Islam) and JUP (Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan), and 
with urban-based Islamist parties such as the JI (Jamaat-e-Islami), at the 
expense of modernist Islam, which did not enjoy much following and was 
seen by many as the expression of Westernised elites out of sync with the 
country. Political rhetoric and school textbooks increasingly focused on 
Sunni Deobandi Islam as the basis of „the ideology‟ of the country, the 
defense of which justified limitations to human rights and political 
freedom.10 The Islamisation of society accelerated under the military 
regime of Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, when Pakistan became a conduit of US 
and Saudi aid to anti-Soviet mujaheddin, continued through the judiciary 
and could not be reversed by subsequent governments.  
Reliance on religion by elites, both civil and military, for internal and 
                                                             
9 Punjabis are roughly 44%; Pashto and Sindhis account for 15% each, Baluchis 4%; 97% 
of the population is Muslim and the remaining 3% is mainly Christian and Hindu. 
There are communities who consider themselves Muslims, such as the Ahmadis, but 
who are not considered as such by Pakistani law and most fellow Sunnis. Shias make 
up 15-25% of the population.  
10 E. GIUNCHI, Rewriting the past: political imperatives and curricular reform in 
Pakistan, «Textbooks Controversies in India and Pakistan/Schulbuchkontroversen in 
Indien und Pakistan (Internationale Schulbuchforschung/International Textbook 
Research) », vol. 29, no. 4, 2007, pp. 375-388. 
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foreign policy goals, has contributed to the silencing of progressive voices 
and fed strife between competing representatives of „authentic‟ Islam. 
Religious violence has increased over the decades, becoming an endemic 
source of instability, pitting Muslims against Ahmadis and Christians, 
Sunnis against Shias, Barelwis against Deobandis, local traditionalist 
militias against foreign qaedist groups. At the same time, ethnic tension 
has continued to simmer, particularly in Sindh, with ethnicity bearing 
distinct class overtones within urban areas, and in Baluchistan, which has 
long been the theatre of a low intensity conflict.  
Punjabis, and to a lesser extend Mohajirs and Pashtuns, continue to be 
over-represented in the military, and Punjabis also dominate the higher 
echelons of the bureaucracy. Ethnic-based parties such as the MQM 
(Muttahida Quami Movement) have wide following, and even the two 
major parties, the PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) and PML-N (Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz), continue to have their strongholds respectively 
in Sindh, where the Bhutto family is from, and Punjab, the home province 
of the Sharif family. According to an opinion survey conducted in 2013 
before the national elections by the Herald in partnership with the 
Sustainable Development Policy Institue (SDPI), the highest level of 
support for the PPP was pledged by Sindhis, followed by Seraiki-speakers. 
Punjabis and Hindko speakers intended to vote for the PML-N.11. 
Some policy-oriented suggestions 
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, as elsewhere, ethnic and religious strife is 
not the inevitable product of entrenched, fixed diversities, but the 
consequence of fairly recent policies by dominant political elites, 
characterized by forms of unequal political inclusion and an unequal 
distribution of resources. External interference has contributed to the 
politicization of identities, while the manipulation of religious sentiments 
by the elites to counter centrifugal forces ahs had the effect to fuel 
communitarian divisions.  
Solutions to internal strife are complex and multi-faceted, and involve 
far-reaching reforms addressing inequities and access to political capital 
and economic resources. Although a full discussion of the political and 
institutional measures that may be instrumental in preventing ethnic and 
religious strife is beyond the scope of this paper, some limited measures 
can be suggested in the socio-cultural realm, a policy arena often 
overlooked. 
In this respect, it may be useful to: 
                                                             
11 Elections 2013. Survey indicates close contest, 9 February 2013, 
http://dawn.com/2013/02/09/elections-2013-survey-indicates-close-contest/. 
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 foster freedom of expression so as to allow progressive readings of 
religion to gain currency and all ethnic groups that feel 
discriminated to express their grievances and advance proposals 
to meet them.  
 Ensure that contributions of minor ethnic or religious groups are 
not erased from school texts and thus national memory  
 Guarantee that the debates on state-building involve all elements 
of civil society, including its rural and tribal elements that are 
often neglected as „uncivil‟.  
 Promote a socio-economic vision from which all citizens would 
benefit, irrespective to their identity.  
These are no easy tasks, as dominant groups – and groups allied to them, 
such as religious conservative parties - will resist any challenge to their 
position, and will be apprehensive of an open and critical society. 
Protecting the cultural identity of ethnic and religious minorities may also 
seem to run counter the assimilationist or integrationist strategies of 
dominant elites. However, anthropologists have long ago shown how 
individuals possess multiple identities and loyalties, which can coexist 
with each other. The national sense of belonging can exist alongside ethnic 
and religious loyalties provided that culture-specific values are not 
imposed from above and accompanied by blatant asymmetries in the 
power structures. Reciprocal recognition and integration, through 
legislative, institutional and educational means, rather than top down 
imposition may be the key to national cohesion. 
We should also be aware that by promoting a specific political and 
economic system the international community may fuel sub-national 
fissures if that system masks an unequal distribution of power within the 
state institutions. Clinging on to cultural specificities can be in fact a way 
of resisting the imposition of political and cultural sameness behind which 
hide the interests of a dominating group.  
Sub-national identities can also be fuelled by the inefficiency and 
corruption of the state, or by its absence: it is well known that in contexts 
where courts are perceived as corrupt, distant and costly, litigants tend to 
refer to unofficial mechanisms of redress thus supporting consolidated 
power networks. Reinforcing the state apparatus, widening its reach and 
erasing corruption may therefore be a key to limiting the persistence of 
parallel systems of governance and justice which embody different 
sub-national identities and hinder nation-building. 
The case of Afghanistan and Pakistan and their problems in establishing 
a consensus based political system remind us of the challenges faced by 
many other countries. As Tunisia, Libya and Egypt revise their political 














heterogeneity (Libya) and religious discrimination (Egypt) should not be 
neglected. Clearly, the assumption that the introduction of formal 
democracy will foster per se internal cohesion and peace, irrespective of 
how power is distributed and of how national memory is constructed, is 
flawed. 
 
